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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Possession of Marijuana with Intent
to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1992). This
Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erroneously rejected defendant's claim that, as a matter

of law, he was entrapped into committing the crime of possessing marijuana with intent to
distribute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant first challenges the trial court's rejection of his claim that he was
entrapped, as a matter of law. We must therefore determine whether the trial
court properly identified and interpreted the law regarding entrapment when it
ruled that the law did not require a finding that he was entrapped. This clearly

presents a question of law. . . . "When a challenge to a trial court's decision
concerns a question of law, we accord no particular deference, but review for
correctness." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1992):
(1)
It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed
by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense
in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2)
The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution
is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3)
The defense provided by this section is available even though the
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4)
Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence
on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least
ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a later
filing.
(5)
Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant
was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
-2-

(6)
In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of
entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except
that in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past
convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the defendant and a hearing
on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant Kim Beddoes ("Beddoes") was charged by Information with Possession of

Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1992) (R.8).
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDING
Beddoes filed several pre-trial motions, including a motion to dismiss, asserting he was

entrapped into committing the alleged crime as a matter of law (R.33 & id.- 57). See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-303 (1992). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted in part and denied
in part some of the pretrial motions (R. 130; R.380-382; Addendum B). The motion to dismiss
on entrapment grounds was initially denied (R.130), but was thereafter taken under advisement
(R.153; R.584), and eventually denied after a jury trial (R.585).
C.

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
On September 27, 1993, the jury found Beddoes guilty as charged (R.582). The court

subsequently sentenced Beddoes to zero to five years in Utah State Prison and imposed a fine
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of $1,000.00. The prison term was suspended in lieu of a thirty-six month probation (R.211;
Addendum C). A notice of appeal was timely filed on December 10, 1993 (R.213).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1

D.

On November 13, 1992, Ned Shepherd, a self-proclaimed drug dealer, was travelling
from California to Utah armed with a shipment of illicit substances, to wit, marijuana (R.303,
311). While traveling through Juab County, Shepherd was stopped by Sergeant Paul Mangelson
of the Utah Highway Patrol (R.304; R.406).2 A search of Shepherd's vehicle revealed fifteen
pounds of marijuana (R.227; R.305; R.406).
At home in Nephi, Utah, chopping woods after a hard day and night of work at the
cement plant was Kim Beddoes (R.329; R.514-516), a known drug user (R.427, 517). Shepherd
and Beddoes have been friends for more than twenty years, since their high school days (R.512513). Beddoes was unaware that his good friend Shepherd was endeavoring to traverse the
highways on November 13 with a load of illicit substances (R.315; R.418).
Discovered also during the search of Shepherd's person was a "piece of paper" (R.227).
Several names and phone numbers of Shepherd's friends and relatives were on this piece of
paper (R.277-228; R.419). Unfortunately for Beddoes, his name and phone number were on

1

Beddoes assert that he was entrapped into committing the alleged crime, and thus this
case is highly fact sensitive. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2

See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 142 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (describing Sergeant
Mangelson's vigilance in apprehending drug traffickers).
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the piece of paper (R.227). The arresting officers immediately recognized Beddoes' name as
a possible drug user and/or trafficker. At this point, surmising that Beddoes was a "public
nuisance" who deserved to be busted (R.311), the officers decided not to pursue Shepherd but
to go after Beddoes. In essence, in a rather perverted way of fighting the war on drugs, the
officers chose to release a big fish into the ocean with the hope of catching a small one (R.423424); see Williamson v. United States, _ U.S. _ , 62 U.S.L.W. 4639, 4642 (June 27, 1994)
(attached as Addendum D). The stage was thus set for a deal in which Shepherd would waylay
an unwary Beddoes. To ensure the success of the deal, the State made Shepherd a lucrative
offer that not many reasonable human beings would refuse: His felony charges would be reduced
to a misdemeanor and no forfeiture and/or drug stamp tax prosecutions would follow3 if
Shepherd agreed to make a controlled delivery of marijuana to the residence of his best friend
of twenty years (R.230, 276-278; R.312-313). Shepherd accepted the deal, albeit, he claimed,
reluctantly (R.314), apparently because he felt guilty about entrapping his friend (R.546).
With Bill Thompkins, a Juab County deputy sheriff, Don Ellis, a sergeant with the Utah
Department of Public Safety, and Andre Leavitt of the Utah County Narcotics Task Force,
directing (R.308; R.423-424), a plan was devised for Shepherd to call Beddoes' home and then
deliver to him about twenty-three ounces or a pound of marijuana (R.314; R.407, 468). Prior

3

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-13 (1992) (forfeiture of instrumentalities used in
transporting controlled substances) and 59-19-101 (1992) (penalties for failure to purchase Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax).
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to November 13, Shepherd normally sold about four ounces of marijuana to Beddoes (R.311312, 320).4
After several abortive tries (R.329), Shepherd contacted Beddoes at home over the phone,
stating briefly that he was coming to the Beddoes residence (R.316). There was no discussion
about drugs (R.280). When Shepherd entered Beddoes' residence, according to the electronic
device monitoring Shepherd's movement and conversation, the two exchanged greetings and
Shepherd handed twenty-three ounces of marijuana to Beddoes. He advised Beddoes that the
cost of the marijuana was $1,600.00 in addition to $450.00 previously owed on a prior supply
(R.231; R.319-320; R.411). Because of the unusually large quantity of marijuana brought to
him this time (R.544), Beddoes was rather "surprised" (R.427) and thus refused to accept
delivery, claiming he had no money (R.517).
The illicit nature of the drug trade and lack of trust amongst traders require that the
enterprise be conducted strictly on cash basis. "Fronting" or credit extension, though not
uncommon, is viewed disfavorably. Even when fronting is absolutely necessary, for example,
when the buyer's bad habit has to be supported during withdrawal, the seller would only front
controlled substances once but never twice (R.549). Although the plan in this case was not
perfectly designed since Beddoes had no money to pay for the drugs, Shepherd had to improvise
rather swiftly in order to consummate the transaction at any cost and obtain the benefits of his

4

Accordingly, as further described below, Beddoes was "surprised" by the amount of
marijuana "fronted" him on the 13th by Shepherd (R.427).
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deal with the State. To that end, Shepherd made a rather "extremely unusual" move by
"fronting" one pound of marijuana to Beddoes, without having collected the $450.00 Beddoes
owed him on the previous supply (R.549). Unbeknownst to him that Shepherd was working
surreptitiously for the government and believing he was getting a pretty good deal, Beddoes
accepted the fronted marijuana, without payment (R.411-12).
Shortly thereafter, the police executed a search warrant at Beddoes' residence (R.231232).5 Beddoes was located in the bathroom attempting to flush the marijuana down the toilet.
He was apprehended and arrested for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute (R.233).
Thereafter, Beddoes filed a motion to dismiss, asserting he was entrapped into
committing the alleged crime as a matter of law (R.33 & id. at 57). After an evidentiary
hearing, the motion to dismiss on entrapment grounds was taken under advisement (R.153;
R.584), and eventually denied after a jury trial (R.585).
The jury found Beddoes guilty as charged (R.582).

Subsequently, the court sentenced

Beddoes to zero to five years in Utah State Prison and imposed a fine of $1,000.00. The prison
term was suspended in lieu of a thirty-six month probation (R.211). This appeal then followed
(R.213).

5

A warrant to search Beddoes' residence was obtained while the controlled delivery was
being hatched (R.450).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because the district court made no findings of fact on Beddoes' entrapment claim, this
Court lacks the necessary tool for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, this case should
be remanded for the trial court for factual findings and conclusions of law. In the event this
Court finds the record sufficient for review, Beddoes urges this Court to conclude that he was
entrapped into committing the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when
the State literally gave him twenty-three ounces of marijuana without requiring him to pay for
the substances on the spot.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LACK OF FACTUAL FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT ON BEDDOES'
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES ON ENTRAPMENT GROUNDS
REQUIRES A REMAND.
This Court has often stated that entrapment cases are highly factual in nature. See State
v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Accordingly, when there is conflicting
evidence presented to the court at an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss on entrapment
grounds the trial court is obligated to assess the witnesses' credibility and make factual findings.
See State v. Castas, 567 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1977). Accord, State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d
517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern which
version of the evidence the jury eventually adopts in rejecting an entrapment defense, trial courts
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should be required to make factual findings whether or not the defense is also presented to a
jury.6 See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) ("Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion,
the court shall state its findings on the record."); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 549-50 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105
(Utah 1990).
Apart from Rule 12(c) mandate, the entrapment statute requiring the trial court to
"determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the
offense,"7 was obviously intended to have the court make factual findings and conclusions of
law independent of the jury. Section 76-2-303(4) does not contemplate the trial court delegating
to the jury an important, statutorily imposed duty. Moreover, a rule requiring the trial court to
make entrapment findings independent of the jury fulfills another important ambition: it provides
appellate court and counsel meaningful avenue for resolving critical legal issues. See Genovesi,
871 P.2d at 550; State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).8

6

Compare State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (entrapment defense
renewed before jury upon trial court denial of motion to dismiss) with Richardson, 843 P.2d at
517 (defendant entering conditional guilty plea upon trial court denial of motion to dismiss on
entrapment grounds).
7

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(4) (1992).

8

This purpose is particularly more central in cases where, after the trial court denies a
motion to dismiss on entrapment grounds, the defendant opted to enter a conditional plea to the
charges. E.g., Richardson, 843 P.2d at 517.
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In this case, the district court recognized not only that Beddoes had come forward with
prima facie entrapment evidence, but also that the facts of the case are rather close and thus
reasonable "minds may differ" as to whether Beddoes was entrapped as a matter of law. See
R. 585; Addendum A. However, the court made no factual findings on entrapment; nor did the
court eventually conclude that defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law. Rather, the court
simply decided to "leave [the issue] up to the jury." Id. The trial court should not be allowed
to pass the buck on the critical legal question of whether the government entrapped a citizen into
committing a crime s/he would have otherwise committed. Accordingly, this case should be
remanded for the district court to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law on
entrapment. The following argument is presented in the alternative were this Court to find
something to review in the district court's cursory denial of Beddoes' motion to dismiss.
POINT n
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant first challenges the trial court's rejection of his claim that he was
entrapped, as a matter of law. We must therefore determine whether the trial
court properly identified and interpreted the law regarding entrapment when it
ruled that the law did not require a finding that he was entrapped. This clearly
presents a question of law. . . . "When a challenge to a trial court's decision
concerns a question of law, we accord no particular deference, but review for
correctness." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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B.

BEDDOES WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER OF LAW
Even considered in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, State v. Moore, 782

P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989),9 the evidence shows that, on November 13, 1992, Shepherd was
pulled over for speeding. The police discovered fifteen pounds of marijuana in his vehicle.
They also found a piece of paper containing names and phone numbers in his wallet. Beddoes'
phone number was on the list. Beddoes and Shepherd have been friends for over twenty years
and the former had purchased marijuana in the past from the latter. In fact, Beddoes owed
Shepherd $450.00 from a previous drug supply. However, Beddoes was unaware that Shepherd
was bringing marijuana to Utah that day. Subsequently, the police made a deal with Shepherd
to supply twenty-three ounces of marijuana to Beddoes under controlled circumstances. In
exchange, he was assured that his felony charges would be reduced to a misdemeanor and no
civil proceedings would be instituted. Thereafter, Shepherd went to Beddoes's residence and
told Beddoes the price was $1,600.00 for the marijuana and reminded Beddoes he still owed
$450.00 on a previous supply. Shepherd was paid neither $1,600.00 nor $450.00. Rather, he
"fronted" the marijuana to Beddoes, even though he had never before fronted him marijuana
twice without collecting on the previous debt. In addition, Shepherd had never supplied such
a large quantity of marijuana to Beddoes before. See R.406, 412-418, 419-427, 512, 517-518.

9

Beddoes reiterates that the trial court should have made findings of fact pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) and Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c).
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In this case of first impression this Court is called upon to determine whether the police
entrapped Beddoes into committing the crime of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute
by furnishing him marijuana for free. Section 76-2-303(1) provides:
It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready
to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the supreme court determined that section 76-2303(1) had adopted the objective standard for determining entrapment. Under this standard, "the
focus is not on the propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the
police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings
respond, for the proper use of governmental power." Id. at 500; accord, Martinez, 848 P.2d
at 707. The court goes on to state:
In assessing police conduct under the objective standard, the test to determine an
unlawful entrapment is whether a law enforcement official or an agent, in order
to obtain evidence of the commission of the offense, induced the defendant to
commit such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be effective
to persuade an average person, other than one who was merely given the
opportunity to commit the offense.
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity,
or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are
examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case, of what
might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the course of conduct
between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions leading
up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the
- 12-

response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what
the effect of the governmentaTs agent conduct would be on a normal person.
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 (footnote omitted).
When, as here, at police insistence, a friend of more than twenty years in essence offered
another friend twenty-three ounces of marijuana in exchange for nothing, Taylor instructs that
the State has crossed the line between permissive police conduct and lawlessness, if it attempts
to prosecute the latter for violating the law. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 501, 504. This clearly is
not a case involving "mere existence of a personal relationship [insufficient to] establish
entrapment." Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707. Here, there was personal relationship plus more: had
Shepherd insisted, as he normally does, that Beddoes pay him the $450.00 owing, Beddoes
would certainly not have taken possession of the marijuana because he had no money to pay for
it. In short, the fronting of the marijuana in this case is tantamount to inducement coerced by
"offers of inordinate sums of money," which Taylor strongly condemned. See Taylor, 599 P.2d
at 503. In other words, that Beddoes was given, rather than made to pay for, twenty-three
ounces of marijuana, created a "substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit." Id. at 504.
Although every entrapment case arguably is sui generis, Martinez, 848 P.2d at 706, this
case typifies how the State employs "immoral and unethical tactics" in combatting "the war on
drugs." State v. heVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1025 n.l (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d
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1356 (Utah 1993).10 Beddoes, who was not expecting any shipment of marijuana, was actually
given the illegal substance for free, so that the State could obtain evidence of a crime. In
essence, the prosecuting arm of the State manufactured a crime and then seeks the judiciary's
ratification of its lawlessness. This Court should not countenance such a perverted use of
governmental power. Cf. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1988) (leaving open
question whether police manufacture of a crime could violate defendant's due process rights).
Thus, sound public policy is undoubtedly advanced by a court-fashioned prophylactic rule
prohibiting the State from entangling itself in illicit drug trade.
Utah appellate courts have not dealt with the issue of police providing illicit substances
to citizens and then prosecuting them for possessing narcotics with intent to distribute. But
M

[c]ourts from other jurisdictions have taken a dim view of this police conduct." State v.

Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 441 (N.D. 1992) (citing numerous cases). See generally Comment,
Criminal Procedure: Entrapment Rationale Employed to Condemn Government's Furnishings of
Contraband, 59 Minn.L.Rev. 444 (1974). These courts have applied -- and justifiably so - the
per se rule that, without more, police conduct of furnishing controlled substances to citizens in
an attempt to ferret out criminals establishes entrapment as matter of law. See, e.g., United
States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975).
10

Cf. Williamson, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4642 (describing the antithesis of this case: how small
time drug dealers and users normally help the police catch big time dealers). See generally
Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law Enforcement Justification, 67
Notre Dame L.Rev. 745, 795-97 (1992).
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The per se rule, indeed, has attracted a larger audience in jurisdictions, like Utah,
employing the objective entrapment standard, see Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 844-45 (Alaska
1976), precisely because it seeks to deter improper law enforcement techniques, consistent with
the age-old rationale for the entrapment defense. Kummer, 481 NW.2d at 443. A rationale for
the per se rule is explained thus:
Frequently, it is permissible law enforcement practice for an undercover agent to
obtain evidence of unlawful traffic in narcotics by purchasing heroin from a
suspected peddler. But when the government's own agent has set the accused up
in illicit activity by supplying him with narcotics . . . the role of the government
has passed the point of toleration. Moreover, such conduct does not facilitate
discovery or suppression of ongoing illicit traffic in drugs. It serves no justifying
social objective. Rather, it puts the law enforcement activities in the position of
creating new crime for the sake of bringing charges against a person they have
persuaded to participate in wrongdoing.
West, 511 F.2d at 1085 (quoted in Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 437). Additionally, the per se rule
fulfills another important ambition: it "eliminates any excuse for law enforcement officers or
agents to possess controlled substances, except during the brief span between the seizure or
undercover purchase and the placement of the drugs in the police evidence locker, thereby
facilitating enforcement of anti-corruption measures." Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 442 (citing R.
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 163, 191 (1976)).
Based on the foregoing, under either the traditional case by case standard or the per se
standard, Beddoes was entrapped into committing the crime of possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute. Accordingly, the district court erred in forwarding the
question of entrapment to the jury and in denying Beddoes motion to dismiss because the
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evidence presented by the State did not negate entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. See State
v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980). Cf. State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 590
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Beddoes urges this Court to remand the case to the district
court for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the alternative, this Court should
find, as a matter of law, that Beddoes was entrapped into committing the charged offense.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 1994.

RONALD J. YENGICH

HAKEEM ISHOLA
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's
Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this

day of July, 1994, to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney

General, and Carol Clawson, Solicitor General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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ADDENDUM A
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

that "On or about the 13th day of November, 1992, in
Juab County, State of Utah, the defendant," who is Kim
Beddoes here today, "unlawfully did commit a third
degree felony by violating Utah's Controlled Substance
Act as follows: the defendant did knowingly or
intentionally possess marijuana, a controlled
substance, with the intent to distribute, contrary to
the statutes of the State of Utah."
And now that's the allegation that's been
made by the State.

And I've already indicated to you

that the defendant has pled not guilty to that
allegation, those charges, and that's why we're here
today to try the issue before the Court.
MR. EYRE:

Thank you, your Honor.

Counsel, members of the jury, we're at that
stage of the trial where I have an opportunity to give
you a brief opening statement as to what the State of
Utah will attempt to introduce as evidence here today.
I think most of you know my name is Donald
Eyre, and I'm the Juab County Attorney.

It's my

obligation to represent the interests of the State of
Utah in this matter with respect to the prosecution of
the defendant.
The defendant Kim Beddoes has been charged
with the crime of possessing marijuana with the intent
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God.
MR. SHEPHERD:
THE COURT:

Yeah,

Have a chair right here,

Mr. Shepherd.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. EYRE
Q

Mr. Shepherd, the jury is the people that

need to hear you, so speak to them when I ask you
questions.

State your name.

A

Ned C. Shepherd.

Q

And where do you reside?

A

In Springville, Utah.

Q

And where are you employed, Mr. Shepherd?

A

Geneva Steel.

Q

And how long have you been employed there?

A

Twenty years,

Q

Mr. Shepherd, are you acquainted with the

defendant Kim Reddoes?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

How long have you known Mr. Beddoes?

A

In excess of 20 years.

Q

And how have you known him?

A

As a friend.

Q

And have you come together socially with him

in the past?

Vnnrl*
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Gone hunting with him --

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

—

those type of things?

Referring you to

5

November the 13th of last year, were you within Juab

6

County on that date?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And on that date were you traveling back from

9

California?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And were you stopped by Sergeant Paul

12

Mangelson?

L3

A

Yes.

L4

Q

And were you arrested at that time?

.5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And what were you arrested for?

7

A

Possession of marijuana of in excess of 16

8
9
0

ounces
Q

And, in fact, you had 15 pounds; is that

correct?

1

A

That's correct.

2

Q

And at the time of your arrest were you

3

interviewed by Bill Tompkins the Juab County Deputy?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And were you also interviewed by John Ellis
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1

of the Utah Department of

2

I

A

3

|

Q

Investigations?

Yes.
M r . Shepherd, in your wallet at the time of

your arrest did you have a list of names and phone
5

I

numbers?

6

A

Y e s , I did.

7

Q

And in that list, was the defendant Kim

8

Beddoes ' name there and his phone

number?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

After the interview with Officer Tompkins

11

Mr. Ellis, did you agree to deliver some marijuana

12

Mr. Beddoes?

and
to

13

A

Y e s , I did.

14

Q

Did you also agree to deliver to some other

15

people in Utah

County?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Were the individuals

that you agreed

18

deliver

19

list?

20

A

Y e s , they w a s .

23

Q

Prior to going to California

to

in Utah County, were their names also on that

to pick up this

22

marijuana, had you made any -- had any prior

23

with Mr. Beddoes concerning his sharing in that

24

marijuana?

25

A

T

can't remember.

contact

Yeah, I think so.
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Q

And he wasn't aware of the date that you were

going to be there; is that correct?
A

He had no idea.

Q

But had he asked you for a portion of that

marijuana?
A

No.

I think I just told him that I would be

going.
Q

Okay.

When you were stopped by the officers

and they talked to you about delivering some marijuana
to Mr. Beddoes, did you make a phone call to him?
A

Yes, T did.

Q

Do you recall approximately what time that

was that that phone call took place?
A

In the afternoon.

Q

You were stopped in the morning; is that

correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And when you called the first time, was Kim

home?
A

No

Q

So you had to call a second time?

A

Several times.

Q

Finally he was home; is that correct?

A

That's correct.

Q

And what did you say to him and what did he

T don't remember how many.
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1
2

say back to you at that time?
A

3
4
5
6

He said "Hello."
I said -- I can't remember.

I said to stay

there, and -- T think I just said just to stay there.
Q

When you had been to Mr. Beddoes' house on

other occasions, had you called him similarly?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

Was that a common practice for you to do?

9

A

That's common.

10

Q

So you'd just call to see if he was there?

11

A

Yeah, and to stay there, I'll be there.

12

Q

After you had that phone conversation, did

13

the officers make arrangements with you how you were

14

to conduct this transaction?

15

A

That's true.

16

Q

What did they do, the officers?

17

A

They told me to talk about things in the

18

past.

19

wire -- a listening device on my chest and give me a

20

pound of marijuana approximately.

21
22

Q

They told me to deliver it to him.

They put a

Did you have a conversation with the officers

concerning what amount they ought to take up there?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And whose suggestion was the pound?

25

A

I did.
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Q

And so they provided you with what you

suggested; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And they then put a wire so they could listen

to your conversation; is that correct?
A

That's correct,

Q

And did you then travel to Mr. Beddoes'

house?
A

Yes.

Q

And what way did you enter?

Did you enter

the front door?
A

No.

Q

How did you enter?

A

He has a garage that has a basement door.

pulled up.

I

He met me halfway, I believe, and that's

how we entered was through the basement door.
Q

Okay.

After you had entered his house, how

did you carry the marijuana?
A

I carried it underneath my coat.

It was in a

paper bag.
Q

In a paper bag?

And after you entered the

house, did you have a conversation with him?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Who talked first, do you recall?

A

I think I did.
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Q

What did you say?

A

Let's see,

"You got the money?"

"Have you

got any money?" or something to that effect.

And he

said, "No."
Q

Then what did you say?

A

And then -- gee, it's hard to remember

exactly what I said,

I handed him the pound.

And

then T told him it would be $1,600 for that pound,
plus what he owed me.

And then I told him the total

amount.
Q

And this was all being tape recorded; is that

correct?
A

Yeah, there was a listening device on me.

I

imagine it was taped.
Q

So you handed it right to him?

A

Yes.

Q

Did he look into it?

A

I don't recall

Q

And you told him it was going to cost $1,600?

A

That's correct.

Q

Did he make any comment to that or try to

dicker price with you?
A

No.

Q

And after you told him -- commented to him

that he still owed you some money; is that correct?
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A

Yeah.

Q

And then you told him the total amount that

he owed you; is that correct?
A

That's correct,

Q

Did you then leave or did you stay for any

time?
A

No, I turned around and left right then.

Q

Did you observe anyone else in the house at

that time?
A

No.

Q

After you left, what did you do?

A

I drove down to Main Street here, the main

road, and met with an officer, and then we went back
to the jail.
Q

Okay.

Later that day did you also complete

deliveries to other people in Utah County?
A

It was not that day but the next day I

believe it was.
Q

How many other people?

A

Just one.

Q

And because of your cooperation, did my

office agree to reduce the charges against you?
A

Yes.

Q

From a third degree felony; is that correct?

A

I'm not sure what all the charges that were
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1

pending.

2

Q

But to a misdemeanor; is that correct?

3

A

To a misdemeanor, yes.

4

Q

You're still —

5

the third degree felony

charge is still pending; is that correct?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And the Utah County authorities agreed to

8

cooperate with respect to charges there; is that

9

correct?

10

A

That's correct.

11

Q

Mr. Shepherd, did Mr. Beddoes at any time

12

balk at taking possession of the marijuana'

13

A

Not that I remember.

14

Q

Did you have to argue with him to take it or

15

to take it for that price?

16

No,
Q

17

Was the price that you were selling it to him

18

for similar to what marijuana was going for in other

19

areas?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

It wasn't a low price, was it?

22

A

No.

23

MR. EYRE:

24

THE COURT:

25

You may take the witness.
Cross-examine, Mr. Carter.

///
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CARTER:
Q

I'm kind of interested, Mr. Shepherd, in your

statement there was a prior arrangement- between you
and Mr. Beddoes to purchase some quantity of marijuana
from this 15 pounds.

Is that true or is that not

true?
A

That

—

Q

Well, let's go over this?

A

Okay.

Q

Let's recall your testimony here.

Do you

remember sitting there -A

Sure.

Q

-- before?

Do you remember telling us a

little bit different story last time around?
A

I remember telling you that --

Q

Just answer that yes or no, please.

A

Yes, I remember.

Q

You told me a different story last time?

A

No.
MR. CARTER:

I'd ask the Court to publish the

transcript from the previous hearing.

The original

should be in the file.
THE COURT:

I have it right here, if this is

the one.
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1

MR. CARTER:

It was one prepared by Vonda.

2

There's a preliminary hearing transcript as well, but

3

Vonda prepared the transcript of this hearing.

4
5

MR. EYRE:
Q

Okay.

BY MR. CARTER:

Are you ready?

I'd ask you

6

to go with me and look over that.

7

highlighted there.

8

ask you just to pay a little bit of attention to it.

9

I've got it

Kind of key in on it.

If I could

Let me ask you just a few other questions

10

before we get to that.

11

with the police officers today about your testimony

12

here today or with Mr. Eyre's office?

13
14
15
16

A

Have you had any discussions

I asked them if I could review what had

happened, and they said no.
Q

Do you remember last time you testified did

they give you anything to review?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

What did they give you to review?

19

A

It was papers of what went on.

20

Q

And do you know who prepared that?

21

A

I'm not sure.

22

Q

Someone from the State.

23

The State, I imagine.
It's a document the

State gave to you?

24

A

Mr. Eyre did, yeah.

25

Q

It wasn't a situation anything that you had
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1

written up; correct?

2

A

That's correct.

3

Q

It was something they had written up; is that

4

correct?

5

A

That's correct.

6

Q

All right.

Now, tell me about this -- as I

7

understand it, you pled to a Class B misdemeanor,

8

possession of marijuana; correct?

9

A

That's what they plan on.

10

Q

That hasn't been done yet?

11

A

That hasn't been done yet, no.

12

pending.

13

Q

Do you know why it's taking so long?

14

A

So that I'll testify in this case.

15

Q

And they're afraid that you might not testify

16

It's still

or not testify what they perceive to be the truth?

17

A

Well, yeah.

18

Q

And they want to make sure that they get

19

They want me to show up, yeah.

their story from you; is that correct?

20

A

That's correct, yeah.

21

Q

And then after this thing is all done with

22

Mr. Beddoes, they're going to kick it down to a Class

23

B misdemeanor; is that correct?

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

Let's go over this, page 21, line 13.
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These

1

are questions I asked you.

2

A

Do you want we to read it?

3

Q

Let me ask you the questions, and you read

4

the answers, so we can replay this as best we can for

5

the jury.

6

My question to you, "So there was no

7

agreement that he would get any portion of this

8

marijuana that you were bringing?"

9

And your answer at that time was what?

10

A

It says, "Not really, no."

11

Q

Question, "Did he, in fact, know that you

12

were down in California on this date surrounding

13

November 13th?"

And your answer?

14

A

"No."

15

Q

No one even knew; correct?

16

A

No one knew, not even my wife.

17

Q

Let's go to page 40 of the transcript.

18

asked you at that time, "There had been no prior

19

arrangements made by him with you to purchase any

20

amount of marijuana; correct?"

21

A

MR. EYRE:

23

MR. CARTER:

25

Your answer?

"That was correct, yeah."

22

24

I

What page are you referring to?
That was page 40, starts at

line 6.
THE WITNESS:

That's not exactly what he said
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1

when he asked this question -- when Mr. Eyre asked

2

this question before.

3
4

Q

I took it as would he --

BY MR. CARTER:

The truth is Mr. Beddoes knew

nothing about you going to California; correct?

5

A

He knew nothing about me going to California.

6

Q

The truth is Mr. Beddoes had no prior

7

arrangements for you to deliver him any marijuana from

8

this 15 pounds; is that correct?

9

A

That's correct.

10

Q

No one even knew you went to California.

11

A

That's correct.

12

Q

You went to California, and you bought 15

13

Nobody talked about it.

pounds of marijuana; correct?

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q

And who were you going to deliver that 15

16
17
18

pounds to, do you recall?
A

I was going to deliver it to -- some of it

was to Mr. Beddoes, but most of it was in Utah County.

19

Q

And who is in Utah County?

20

A

I can't mention his name.

21

Q

Why not?

22

A

I would hate to incriminate him

23

Q

So he hasn't been charged yet?

24

A

Yes, he has.

25

Q

Oh, he has been charged?
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A

Yes.

Q

So his name is fairly public right now; isn't

A

Yeah.

Q

But the police know who he is?

A

I don't need to drag him through the mud,

it?

though .
8

Q

What's his name?

9

A

We call him Tuna.

0

Q

What's his formal name?

1

A

Steve Smith.

2

Q

All right.

3

you brought this marijuana back for; is that not true?
MR. EYRE:

4
5

Now, Steve Smith is the gentleman

Objection, your Honor.

Asked and

answered.
THE WITNESS:

6
Q

That's true.

BY MR. CARTER:

This list that they get from

the wallet, what is that list?
A

That's a list I have in my wallet of people

that I call now and again.
Q

Friends?

A

Yeah.

Q

Employer s?

A

Yes.

Q

Fellow workers?
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Q

And you caught him by surprise; wouldn't you

say that was true?
A

I would say, yeah, he was surprised by it, at

the amount.
Q

Who came up with the amount?

Was that you?

A

That was me.

Q

You or the police?

A

That was me.

Q

Let me ask the questions, and then that way

The reason why I was --

we can control it a lot better.
A

Okay.

Q

And then Mr. Eyre can ask questions if he'd

like to.
MR. CARTER:

Judge, I'm looking for a

particular point in the transcript, but I can't find
it yet, and I don't want to sit here and make the jury
wait for me to locate that.

If I could call

Mr. Shepherd in a bit, I'd appreciate that.
THE COURT:
MR. EYRE:
THE COURT:
MR. EYRE:

Any objection to that?
No.
Mr. Eyre, redirect?
A few questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. EYRE:
Mr. Shepherd, you've testified that part of
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1

Q

T apologize for bringing you back

2

Mr. Shepherd, but we have some confusion over

3

statements that were purportedly made to Mr. Beddoes

4

by yourself.

5

listened

We've listened

to a tape and we've

also

to testimony of Mr. Bowles and of Mr. Ellis.
It's reported

6

certain

that in your conversations

with

7

Mr. Beddoes that you made comment that you sold to him

8

a pound of marijuana previously.

9

that not

10

A

true?
That's not true.

11

that's not what happened.

12

the fact that

13

Q

Is that true or is

Whether I said that or not,
11" may have just come out

—

Did anybody w H te a script for you to say --

14

did anybody tell you what to say when you

15

Mr. Beddoes' residence?

approached

16

A

Yeah, they did tell me what to say.

17

Q

But it's not true that you sold Mr. Beddoes a

18

pound;

correct?

19

A

No.

20

Q

You went into Mr. Beddoes' residence, and you

21

Previously, no, it's not.

had a Fargo unit on; correct?

22

A

That's correct, yeah.

23

Q

Have the police played

24
25

conversation
A

to Mr. Beddoes'

Yeah, they played

to you a tape of

that

residence?

it to me to clarify it.
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know is because 450 is what I'd charge for a quaiter
pound.
Q

You'd never sell a pound for $450?

A

I can't buy it for that.

Q

All right.

Tell ™e this, what conversations

did Mr. Tompkins or Mr. Ellis have with you regarding
entrapment?

Did they make any discussions to you

regarding the issue of entrapment?
A

No.

They said what we'd have to do is we

would put a wire on me.
with the amount.

I would approach Mr. Beddoes

I was suppose to talk about a past

experience, the money that he owed me, and how much,
and then make sure that I mentioned marijuana in my
conversation, or pot, or something similar.
Q

In your opinion was Mr. Beddoes entrapped?

A

Yes, I do.
MR. CARTER:

I think he was.
Nothing further.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. EYRE:
Q

Mr. Shepherd, Officer Tompkins did have a

lengthy discussion with you about your past experience
with Mr. Beddoes; is that correct?
A

That's true.

Q

And he asked you specifically as to what

amount you would feel comfortable in delivering to

Vonda Bassett, CSR, RPR

(801) 429-1081

Q

And he tried to talk you out of that; isn't

that also true?
A

I don't remember.

Q

He told you he didn't have the money.

A

He didn't have the money, right.
MR. CARTER:

Okay.

Nothing further.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. EYRE:
Q

But you had fronted him the marJjuana

previously on the time when he owed you the 450; is
that correct?
A

Yeah, right.

Q

So that wasn't unusual for you.

A

No, if they didn't have the money, I'd front

it to them.

It's quite expensive.

MR. EYRE:

Nol-hing further.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CARTER:
Q

But you don't typically front it twice.

You

always make sure you capture your funds from the
previous time; correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

So this would be extremely unusual; correct?

A

That would be so, yeah.
MR. CARTER:

Nothing further.
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advisement?
THE COURT:

N o , I think T'rn ready to rule,

and I probably should have ruled even earlier.

I felt

like there was sufficient evidence at least to make a
prima facie case.
differ.

And I did indicate that minds may

And rather than impose my feeling about

the

evidence, I was going to leave it up to the jury.

So

I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss on the grounds
of the entrapment

defense.

MR. CARTER:

Based on that, then we would

request a presentence
THE COURT:

report.
I'll

refer it to AP£P for a

presentence report and recommendation.

Do you have a

card that you can give Mr. Beddoes?
THE CLERK:

T have one.

Do you have

the

address?
MR. CARTER;
THE CLERK:
MR. CARTER:
THE CLERK:
MP. CARTER:
THE COURT:

N o , I don't.
I have one downstairs.
Provo?
Yes.

Brent Baseman.

Yeah, T do.
Since I'm not sure when

they'll

get it, do you waive the 30 days?
MR. CARTER:
MR. EYRE:

Yeah.
We could hold it- in Provo for
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ADDENDUM B

RULING OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. D-CR-920185

KIM BEDDOES and ANNE1TE
BEDDOES,

RULING

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss and Motions to Suppress Evidence. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the
memoranda of counsel, having entertained oral argument, and upon being advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the charges against Defendant Annette Beddoes

is granted. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the arresting officers had probable cause
to sustain the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and
possession of drug paraphernalia.
2.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on grounds of entrapment of Kim Beddoes is

denied. The conduct of the arresting officers comported with a fair and honorable
administration of justice, and did not create a substantial risk that an average person would
have been induced to commit the crime Defendant Kim Beddoes committed.

3.

Defendants' Motion to Suppress evidence of drug paraphernalia is denied.

The officer who found the drug paraphernalia, Chief Bowles, was legally on the premises
pursuant to a valid warrant authorizing the search for drugs and found the drug paraphernalia
in plain view while searching for those drugs.
4.

Defendants' Motion to Suppress on grounds of illegally concealed recording

device is denied. The informant upon whom the device was concealed consented to
recording the conversation with Defendant Kim Beddoes. Since at least one party to the
recorded conversation consented, no eavesdropping occurred and UCA §76-9-402(l)(a) does
not apply.

Dated this Z7day

of May, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
Shelden Carter

Ruling Page-2-

ADDENDUM C

JUDGMENT

• «<•%* >J

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84 648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

KIM BEDDOES,

:

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND
ORDER OF PROBATION
Criminal No.

Defendant.

:

The defendant, Kim Beddoes, having been found guilty at a jury
trial

on

September

27, 1993

of

the

third

degree

felony

of

possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute.
The matter was referred to the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole for the preparation of a pre-sentence report.
The defendant

and his attorney, Shelden Carter, appeared

before the Court on November 16, 1993 for the entry of Judgment and
Sentencing.
No legal reason having been shown why Judgment should not be
imposed.

It is the Judgment of the Court that the defendant is
1

guilty of the third degree felony of possessing marijuana with the
intent to distribute and is sentenced to serve not more than five
years in the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of $1#000.00 and
a surcharge of $850.00.
Imposition of the prison sentence is suspended upon successful
completion of a 36 month probation upon the following terms and
conditions:
1. The defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation
and Parole and abide strictly with its terms and conditions.
2. The defendant to report to the Department and to the Court
whenever required.
3.

The defendant violate no law either federal, state or

municipal.
4.

The defendant serve six months in the Juab County jail

with the privilege of work release.
5.

The defendant pay the $1,000.00 fine and the $850.00

surcharge, at a reasonable monthly rate set by his probation
officer.
6.

The defendant not use any illegal drugs and submit

himself, his vehicle, and his residence to search without the
necessity of a warrant at the discretion of his probation officer.
7. The defendant to submit to random drug testing without the
necessity of a warrant.
2

8. After completion of the jail sentence, the defendant is to
successfully complete an intensive supervision program, when and
where it* is available.
9.

The defendant is to obtain a drug evaluation and complete

any drug rehabilitation program

as directed by his probation

officer.
10.

In the event the defendant successfully completes the

terms of probation, the Court will consider the defendant's motion
that he be sentenced under the next lower category of offense.
Dated this

2-1

//^^4oU£<^

day of

3

, 1993.

ADDENDUM D

WILLIAMSON v. UNITED STATES

_ The United States

Law Week

Supreme Court
Opinions
Voturoa 62. No. 4d

THE aUftEU) Of NATIONAL AFFAftS, * C WASHINGTON. DX.

Jur*2ft, W 4

OPINIONS ANNOUNCED JUNE 27,
The Supreme Court decided:

F u l l Text of Opinions

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE--Evident*

No. 93-4256

As Bpplied to out-of-court statement implicating both decltr*
m i end mother, hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest, Fed.RJEv. 804(b)(3), allows admission of only those
statements within declarant's narrative that are individually selfinculpatory end excludes non-self-inculpatory statements even if
made within broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory,

(Williamson v. VS.. No. 93-S2S6)

1994

Page 4639

FREDEL WILLIAMSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES
OK WRIT OF CERT10JUJU TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOB THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
No. 93-5256. Argued April 26,1994—Decldad June 27,1964

MASS MEDIA—Cable Television

Musi-carry provisions of 1992 Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act, which require cable television
systems to devote portion of their channels to transmission of
local commercial and public broadcast television stations, ere
content-neutral restrictions on speech that will withstand First
Amendment scrutiny if, on remand, it is determined that they
further asserted important governmental interests in preserving
benefits of free broadcast television, promoting widespread dissemination of information from multiplicity of sources, or promoting fair competition in television programming market, and
that incidental burden on speech is not greater than essential to
further governmental interests. (Turner Broadcasting System v.
Ftdcral Communications Commission. No. 93-44) Page 4647

SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES—Church and State

New York statute that creates public school district eotermieous with religious enclave in order to provide handicapped
achool children with public educational services already available in surrounding community schools to which parents in
enclave refuse to tend their children neither guarantees that
ether religious communities will be treated equally nor constitutes sole method for both providing educational services and
accommodating religious sect's beliefs, and thus violates First
Amendment's Establishment Clause, (Board of Bducation of
Kiryas Jot! Villa* School District v. GrumtU No*. 9J-517,93327.493-539)
Page 4665

NOTE* Waorc a fa deemed desrabk s fytkbiu (acadoeM) eft be iwaeaed
• • • af UK taut tht oatoea k koicd. Tee r/Uaboi moattaiu* ao pan of ibt
cpawje of tht Coun but kat bin prvpmd by tW fuporur of D*diW/or the
CDXTvtak*oi of Ik feeder. See iMltwd $*m*i % Uindt l*mi*r C * . » US.
J21»SJ7.

Section 4

After Reginald Rams refused to testify at petitioner Williamson*
federal trial on eeceiii* possession and distribution charges, the
District Court ruled that, undar Federal Rule of Evidence
gOsfbXSVs hearaey ekcaption for statement* egelnat penal interaitf
a Drug Enforcement Admiaiatratlon agent could recount two custodial interview* in which Karris had freely confessed to receiving
and transporting the drugs in quaetion, but also implicated" Wil*
iiaraaon as the drugs' owner. Williamson was eventually eonvicted,
and the Court of Appaals affirmed.
Held-' The judgment is vacated, and the eaae la ramended.
061 F. 2d 1262, vacated and remanded.
Jusncx O'CONNOft delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parti 1, n-A, and EhB, concluding;
1. The tnoet faithful reading of Rule S04(bK3)—which renders
admisiihle "statement!*) which . . . ao far tenldl to euhject the
declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person
, . , would not have made [them) unless believing [then] to be
true"—u that it does not allow admission of non-eelMnculpatory
abatements, even if they are mad* within a broader narrative that
is generally eelf-inculpetory. Although the statutory term "statement" can maan aither an axtended declaration or a single remark,
the principle behind the Rule, ao far as It is diacarnibla from the
t«*t, points clearly to the narrower reading, ao that only those
remark* within a confession that art individually self-inculpatory
are covered. The Rule U founded on the eomiponaenae notion that
reasonable people, even those who are not eapaeially henaet, tend
not to make aeif-inculpatory etetamente unlace they believt them
to be trua. Tbie notion doe* not attend to a confession's non-eelfinculpatory parte—to parts that are actually eelf-eaculpatory, or to
collateral etoterocnta, tven ones that are neutral aa to interest. A
district court may not just assume that a etetement Is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, especially when the
Statement implicates someone alee. The poliry eipreieed in the
Rule's text is clear enough that it outweighs whatever force lies in
ambiguous statements contained in the Advisory Committal Nate*
to the Rule.
2. The foregoing- reeding does not eviscerate the against penal
internet exception. There are many circumstances in which Kola
g04(bX3) does allow the admiasSon of statements that inculpate a
criminal defendant. Even the conieasiena of arrested accomplices
may be admissible if they are truly eelf-inculpatory, rather than
merely attempt* to ehiit blame or curry favor. Tbe queeUon under
NOTICE: That optaicei arc subjecttoformalmvkiga bttae pobtioiikn in
tbe preliminary prbt of u* Tjajtos SHIM Reports. Harden vrx reqstsied ia
aodfyU* Rcsonar of DBOBOML. Stltra* Court of tbe U&koi Sbta, Waihinitoo, »£» W41, of aay tYMgrmpW or otherformalerron. m order last
amdktti e*y br m*dt before d* pfeiknlnafy prim go* to pnu.
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Harris told Walton that he had lied about the source
of the drugs because he was afraid of Williamson, / d ,
at 61, 68; see also id., at 30-31. Though Harris freely
founding circmnatenetf.
implicated
himself, he did not want his story to be reJUSTICE CCONNOti Jointd by JusTiCI SCALIA, concludad in Part
77-C that, on remand, tht Court of Appeals roan inquire in tb# corded, and he refused to sign a written version of the
statement. ld.% at 24-25. Walton testified that he had
fint instance whathar oath of the statement* in tUrrii' eenieftilon
WM truly •elf-inculpatory. '
promised to report any cooperation by Harris to the
Assistant United States Attorney. Walton said Harris
O'COKNOR, J., announced the jwdftnent of the Court end delivered
was not promised any reward or other benefit for
the opinion of tht Conn with respect to Parts I, tl-A, and XI-B, in
cooperating. Id., at 25-26.
which BUCXUUN, STIVINS, SCALM, BOUTM, and GZNSBURO, JJ.,
Williamson was eventually convicted of possessing coJoined, arid an opinion with respect to Part f!-C, In which SCALIA,
«J.,jeined. 8CAUA» J„ aled a oonnurini opinion, OWSBUXO. J., died
caine with intent to distribute, conspiring to possess
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the Judgment, in cocaine with intent to distribute, and traveling interstate
which BUCKMUN, STEVENS, and Sours*. JJ„ Joined. KENNEDY, J. t
to promote the distribution of cocaine, 21 U. S. C.
filed an opinion concurring in tho judgment, In which REHNQU&T,
§§841(a)(1), 846; 18 U. S, C. §1952. When called to tesC. J.v and THOMAS, J., joinod.
tify at Williamson's trial, Harris refused, even though
the prosecution gave him use immunity and the court
JUSTICE O'CONNOft delivered the opinion of the Court,
ordered him to testify and eventually held him in conexcept as to Part II-C.
tempt. The District Court then ruled thet, under Rule
In this case we clarify the eoope of the hearsay excepB04(bX3), Agent Walton could relate what Harris had
tion for AtatemenU against penal interest Fed. Rule
aaid
to him;
Evid. 804(bX3).
The ruling of the Court is that the statements . . .
I
are admissible under [Rule 804(bX3)], which deals
A deputy aherifff topped the rental car driven by Regiwith statements against interest.
nald Harris for weaving on the highway. Harris eon"First, defendant Harris' statements clearly implieented to a search of the ear, which revealed 19 kilocated himself, and therefore, are against his penal
grams of oocaina in two suitcases in the trunk. Harris
interest.
was promptly arrested.
"Second, defendant Harris, the declarant, ia unShortly after Harris' arrest, Special Agent Donald Walavailable.
ton of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in*
•And third, as I found yesterday, there are suffiterviewed him by telephone. During that conversation,
cient corroborating circumstances in this case to enHarris said that he got the cocaine from an unidentified
sure the trustworthiness of his testimony. ThereCuban in Fort Lauderdale; that the cocaine belonged to
fore, under [United State* v. Harrtll% 788 F. 2d 1524
petitioner Williamson; and that it was to be delivered
(CA11 1986)], these statements by defendant Harris
that night to a particular dumpster. Williamson was
implicating [Williamson] are admissible." App.
also connected to Harris by physical evidence: The lug61-52.
gage bore the initials of Williamson's sister, Williamson
was listed as an additional driver on the car rental
Williamson appealed his conviction, claiming that the
agreement, and an envelop* addressed to Williamson admission of Harris' statement* violated Rule 804(b)(3)
and a receipt with Williamson's girlfriend's address were and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
found in the glove compartment
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
without opinion, judgt order reported at 981 F. 2d 1262
Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke to Harris in
(1992), and we granted certiorari. 610 U. S
(1994).
person. During that interview, Harris said he had
rented the car a few days earlier and had driven it to
II
Fort Lauderdale to meet Williamson. According to Harris, he had gotten the cocaine from a Cuban who was
A
Williamson's acquaintance, and the Cuban had put the
The
hearsay
rule,
Fed.
Rule
Evid. 802, is premised on
cocaine in the car with a note telling Harris how to
the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to
deliver the drugs. Harris repeated that he had been
particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he
instructed to leave the drugs in a certain dumpster, to
might have mispercaived the events which he relates; he
return to his car, and to leave without waiting for
might have faulty memory; hie words might be misunanyone to pick up the drugs.
derstood or taken out of context by the listener. And
Agent Walton then took steps to arrange a controlled
the weys In which these dangers are minimized for indelivery of the cocaine. But as Walton was preparing to
court
statements—the oath, the witness' awareness of
leave the interview room, Harris 'got out of [his] chair
the
gravity
of the proceedings, the jury's ability to ob. , . and . . . took a half step toward [Walton] . . . and
serve the witness' demeanor, and, most importantly, the
. . . said, * . . 1 cant let you do that,' threw his hands
right of the opponent to cross-examine—art generally
up and said that's not true, I can't let you go up there
absent for things said out of court
for no reason/- App. 40. Harris told Walton he had
Nonethelaaa, the Federal Rules of Evidence also recoglied about the Cuban, the note, and the dumpster. The
nize that some kinds of out-of-court statements are less
raaJ story, Harri* aaid, was that he wen transporting the
subject to these hearsay dangers, and therefore except
cocaine to Atlanta for Williamson, and that Williamson
them
from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible.
was traveling in front of him in another rental car.
One such category covers statements thet are against
Harris added that after his car was stopped, Williamson
the declarant's interest;
turned around and drove past the location of the stop,
/statement^] which . . . at the time of [their] makwhere he could see Harris* car with its trunk open.
ing . . . ao far tended to subject the declarant to . • *
Jbid. Because Williamson had apparently seen the pocriminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in
lice searching the car, Harris explained that it would be
the, declarant's position would not have made the
impossible to make a controlled delivery, IdL, at 41.
th* Rult U always whtthor the stsumant i t time was fufScicnDy
against Hit doclarant's ptneJ inurui nndtr the Rult'a lanfuagt.
and thii question can only h% aniwond in iifht of all tha iur-
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etatamentfs] unlets believing [them] to be true."
Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3).
lb decide whether Harris1 confession is made admissible by Rule 804(bX3), we must first determine what the
Rule means by 'statement,* which Federal Rule of Evidence 801(aXl) defines ae "an oral or written assertion."
One possible meaning, Ma report or narrative," Webster's
Third New Internationa] Dictionary 2229, defn. 2(a)
(1961), connotes an extended declaration. Under this
reading* Harris' entire confeBsion~»eveo if it contains
both self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory
parts—would be admissible ao long as in the aggregate
the confession sufficiently inculpates him. Another
meaning of "statement," "a single declaration or remark,*
ibid., defn. 2(b), would make Rule 604(b)(3) cover only
those declarations or remarks within the confession that
are individually self-inculpatory. See also id., at 131
(defining "assertion" as a "declaration"); id., at 886 (defining "declaration" as a "statement").
Although the text of the Rule does not directly resolve
the matter, the principle behind the Rule, so far as it is
discernible from the text, points clearly to the narrower
reading. Rule 604(b)(3) is founded on the commonsanse
notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people
who are not especially honest, tend not to make selfinculpatory statements unless they believe them to be
true. This notion simply does not extend to the broader
definition of "statement." The fact that a person is making a broadly selMnculpatory confession does not make
more credible the confession's non-eelMneulpatory parts.
One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood
with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.
In this respect, it is telling that the non-self-inculpatory
things Harris said in his first statement actually proved
to be false, as Harris himself admitted during the second interrogation. And when part of the confession is
actually self-exculpatory, the generalization on which
Rule 804(b)(3) is founded becomes even less applicable.
Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which
people are most likely to make even when they are
false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the eelftxculpatory statements.
We therefore cannot agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY'S
suggestion that the Rule can be read as expressing a
policy that collateral statements—even onee that are not
in any way against the declarant's interest—are admissible, pott, at 6. Nothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or
the general theory of the hearsay Rules suggests that
admissibility should turn on whether a statement is
collateral to a self-inculpatory statement The fact that
a statement ia self-inculpatory does make it more
reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a
aelf-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the
collateral statement's reliability. We see no reason why
collateral statements, even ones that are neutral aa to
interest, post, at 8-9, ahould be treated any differently
from other hearsay statements that are generally
excluded.
Congress certainly could, avtuect to the constraints of
the Confrontation Clause, make statements admissible
baaed on their proximity to aelf-inculpatory statements.
But we will not lightly assume that the ambiguous language means anything ao inconsistent with the Rule's underlying theory. See Cooler A Oell v. Hartmarx Corp.%
496 U. fi. 384. 394-895, 408-409 (1990). In our view,
* 1 % * *****
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does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statemente, eves if they are made within e broader narrative
that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may
not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(bX8) that a
statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller
confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else. "pThe arrest statements
of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with
special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a code*
fendant'e statements about what the defendant said or
did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence."
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. 8. 530, 641 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bruton v. Vniud States,
S91 U. S. 123, 136 (1968); Dutton v. JEfenns, 400 U. B.
74, 98 (1970) (Harlan, J.f concurring in result).
JUSTICE KENNEDY suggests that the Advisory Commit*
tee Notes to Rule 804(b)(3) should be read as endorsing
the position we reject-that an entire narrative, including non-self»inculpatory parts (but excluding the clearly
self-serving parts, post, at 11). may be admissible if it is
in the aggregate self-inculpatory. &ee post, at 4-5. The
Notes read, in relevant part:
"(T]he third-party confession . . . may include
statements implicating (the accused], and under the
genera] theory of declarations against interest they
would be admissible as related etatements. . . .
[Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. 8. 415 (1965), and
Bruton v. Vnited States, 891 U. S. 123 (1968)] . . .
by no means require that all statements implicating
another person be excluded from the category of declarations against interest, Whether a statement is
in fact against interest must be determined from
the circumstances of each caae. ThUB a statement
admitting guilt and implicating another person,
made while in custody, may well be motivated by a
desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence
fail to qualify as against interest. • . . On the other
hand, the same words spoken under different cireunv
stances, e.g.t to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying. < . . The balancing of selfserving against disaenting [sic] aspects of a declaration is diecueeed in McCormick §256,* 28 U. 8. C.
App., p. 790.
This language, however, is not particularly clear, and
aome of it^—especially the Advisory Committee's endorsement of the position taken by Dean McCormick'* treetiee—points the other way:
"A certain latitude as to contextual statements, neutral aa to interest, giving meaning to the declaration
againtt interest seems defensible, but bringing in
self-serving statements contextuaMy aeems questionable. . * • [Aldmitfting] the disserving parte of the
declaration, and exc)ud[ing] the self-serving parte
. . . eeema the moat realistic method of adjusting
admiesibility to trustworthiness, where the serving
and disserving parts can be eevered." See C. McCormick, Law of Evidence §256, pp. 551-553 (1954)
(footnotes omitted).
Without deciding exactly how much weight to give the
Notes in this particular situation, compare Schiavone v.
Fortune, 477 U. S. 21, 81 (1986) (Notes are to be given
aome weight), with Oreen v Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
490 U. 8. 504, 528 (1989) (SCALXA, J., concurring in
judgment) (Notes ought to be given no weight), we conclude that the policy expressed in the statutory text
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whatever force the Notes may have. And though JUSTICE KENNEDY believes that the text can fairly be read
aa expressing a policy of admitting collateral statements,
pott, at 6, for the reasons given above we disagree.
B
We also do not share JUSTICE KENNEDY'S fears that
our reading of the Rule *eviecerate[e] the against penal
interest exception,* post, at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted), or makes it lack "meaningful effect," post, at 6.
There are many circumstances in which Rule 804(b)(3)
does allow the admission of statements that inculpate a
criminal defendant. Even the confessions of arrested
accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self*
inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame
or curry favor.
For instance, a declarant's squarely self-inculpatory
eonfesaiotv~"yeal I killed X"—will likely be admissible
under Rule 804(b)(3) against accomplices of his who are
being tried under a coconspirator liability theory. See
Pinkerton v. United States. 828 U. S. 640. 847 (1946).
Likewise, by showing that the declarant knew something, a self-inculpatory statement can in some situations help the jury infer that his confederates knew it
aa well. And when seen with other evidence, an accomplice's self-inculpatory statement can inculpate the
defendant directly: "I was robbing the bank on Friday
morning," coupled with someone's testimony that the
declarant and the defendant drove off together Friday
morning, is evidence that the defendant also participated in the robbery.
Moreover, whether a statement is self-inculpatory or
not can only be determined by viewing it in context.
Even statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against the declarants interest. "I hid the
gun in Joe's apartment" may not be a confession of a
crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the
murder weapon, then it is certainly self-inculpatory.
-Sam and 1 went to Joe's home" might be against the
declarant's Interest if a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and
Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's
conspiracy. And other statements that give the police
significant details about the crime may also, depending on the situation, be against the declarant's interest. The question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always
whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant's, penal interest "that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true," and this question
a n only be answered in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.*
C
In this ease, however, we cannot conclude that all that
Harris said was properly admitted. Some of Harris'
confession would clearly have been admissible under
Rule 804(bX3); for instance, when he said he knew
there was cocaine in the suitcase, he essentially forfeited hie only possible defenie to a charge of cocaine
possession, lack of knowledge. But other parts of his
confession, especially the parts that implicated Williamson, did little to subject Harris himself to criminal
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liability. A reaaonable person in Harris' position might
even think that implicating someone else would decrease
his practical exposure to criminal liability, at least so
far as sentencing goes. Small fish in a big conspiracy
often get shorter sentences than people who are running
the whole show, see, t.g.% United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual §3B1.2 (Nov. 1993),
especially if the small fish ere willing to help the authorities catch the big ones, see, e.g., id., at §5K1.1.
Nothing in the record shows that the District Court or
the Court of Appeals inquired whether each of the statements in Harris1 confession was truly self-inculpatory.
As we explained above, this can be a fact-intensive
inquiry, which would require careful examination of all
the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity
involved; we therefore remand to the Court of Appeals
to conduct this inquiry in the first instance.
In light of this disposition, we need not address Williamson's claim that that the statements were also made
inadmissible by the Confrontation Clause, see generally
White v. Illinois, 502 U. S,
(1992), and in particular
we need not decide whether the hearsay exception for
declarations against interest is "firmly rooted" for Confrontation Clause purposes. Compare, e.g., United
States v. Seeley, 892 F. 2d 1, 2 (CAl 1989) (holding that
the exception is firmly rooted), with United States v.
Floret, 985 F. 2d 770 (CAS 1993) (holding the contrary).
We note, however, that the very fact that a statement is
genuinely self-inculpatory—which our reading of Rule
804(bX3) requires—is itself one of the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness'* that makes a statement
admissible under the Confrontation Clause. See Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U. S. 530, 543-545 (1986). We also need
not decide whether, as some Courts of Appeals have
held, the second sentence of Rule 804(b)(3)—"A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement" (emphaais
added>—also requires that statements inculpating the accused be supported by corroborating circumstances. See,
e.g., United Statu v. Alvarez, 684 F. 2d 694, 701 (CA5
1978); United States v. Taggart. 944 F. 2d 637, 840
(CA11 1991). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and th* case is remanded for {unbar proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

JUSTICE SCAIiA, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, which I do not understand
to require the simplistic view of statements against
penal interest that JUSTICE KENNEDY attributes to it.
Whan analyzing whether evidence can be admitted
under the atatement-against-penal-interest exception to
the hearsay rules, the relevant inquiry must always be,
as the text directs, whether the statement "at the time
of its making • . . ao far tended to subject the declarant
to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reaaonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true.* Fed. Rule
Evid, 804(b)(3). I quite agree with the Court that a
reading of the term "statement11 to connote an extended
declaration (and which would thereby allow both self•Of taunt, aa eetompHeo'a statsmsnti may also ha admlsaibl* un- inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory pans of a declarader ethsr pitrviaioieS of Rule* SO 1-604. For butanes, •taumtnts tion to be admitted ao long as the declaration in the
sssde infartfcoreneeof tha tsiuplreey may bo admieiibl* nndar Rule aggregate was sufficiently inculpatory) is uneupportable,
$01(dX2XE), and other statements chat boar ciKumiUntial fuarantsea of trustworthy** msy bt aimiasiblt unasf RuJf $04(bX5>, th* See ante, at 4-5.
Employing the narrower definition of "statement," BO
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that Rule 804(b)(3) allows admission of only those
remarks that are individually self-inculpatory, does not,
as JUSTICE KENNEDY states, "eviscerate the against
penal interest exception." Post, at 7 (internal quotations
and citation omitted). A atiitement obviously can be
self-inculpatory (in the sense of having so much of a
tendency to subject one to criminal liability that a
reasonable person would not make it without believing
it to be true) without consisting of the confession "1
committed X element of crime Y." Consider, for example, a declarant who stated: "On Friday morning, I went
into a gunshop and (lawfully) bought a particular type
of handgun and particular type of ammunition. I then
drove in my 1958 blue Edsel and parked in front of the
First City Bank with the keys in the ignition and the
driver's door ajar. I tben went inside, robbed the bank
and shot the security guard** Although the declarant
has not confessed to any element of a crime in the first
two sentences, those statements in context are obviously
against his penal interest, and I have no doubt that a
trial judge could properly admit them.
Moreover, a declarant's statement 1$ not magically
transformed from a statement against penal interest into
one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant
names another person or implicates a possible codefendant. For example, if a lieutenant in an organized
crime operation described the inner workings of an
extortion and protection racket, naming some of the
other actors and thereby inculpating himself on racketeering and/or conspiracy charges, I have no doubt that
some of those remarks could be admitted as statements
against penal interest. Of course, naming another
person, if done, for example, in a context where the
declarant is minimising culpability or criminal exposure,
can bear on whether the statement meets the Rule
804(bX8) standard. The relevant inquiry, however-^and
one that is not furthered by clouding the waters with
manufactured categories such as 'collateral neutral" and
•collateral eelf-aerving," eee, e.g., post, at 3, 9—must
always be whether the particular remark at issue (and
not the extended narrative) meets the standard set forth
in the Rule,
JUSTICE GjNsmmo, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUK.
JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE SOUTER join, concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment
I join Parts I, II-A, and II-B of the Courta opinion.
I agree with the Court that Federal Rule of Evidence
604(bX3) except* from the general rule that hearsay
statements are inadmissible only "those declarations or
remarks within [a narrative] that are individually selfinculpatory." Ante, at 5. As the Court explains, the
exception for statements against penal interest "does not
allow admission of non-selMnculpatory statements, even
If they are made within a broader narrative that is
generally aelf-inculpatory,* <wta, at 6; the exception
applies only to statements that are 'sufficiently against
the declarant's penal interest that a reasonable person
in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true." Ante, at 9,
quoting Fed. Rule Evid. 804(bX3).
Further, the Court recognises the untrustworthineee of
Statements implicating another person. Ante, at 6. A
person arrested in incriminating circumstances has a
strong incentive to shift blame or downplay his own role
in comparison with that of others, in hopes of receiving
* shorter sentence and leniency in exchange for cooperation. For this reason, hearsay accounts of a suspect's
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Statements implicating another person have been held
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. See Lee
v. IlUnoiB, 476 U. S. 530, 541 (1986) ("when one person
accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which
the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the
accusation is presumptively suspect and must be
subjected to the scrutiny of crosa-examination"); ibid.
("TT]he arrest statements of a co-defendant hsve traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his
strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to
exonerate himself, a co-defendant's statements about
what the defendant said or did are less credible than
ordinary hearsay evidence/ - ) (quoting Bmton v. United
States. 891 U. S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
" Unlike JUSTICE O'CONNOK, however, I conclude that
Reginald Harria* statements, as recounted by DEA
Special Agent Donald E. Walton, do not fit, even in pari,
within the exception described in Rule 804(b)(3), for
Harris*.arguably inculpatory statements are too closely
intertwined with his self-serving declarations to be
ranked as trustworthy Harris was caught red-handed
with 19 kilos of cocaine—enough to subject even a firsttime offender to a minimum of 12Vt years' imprisonment.
8ee United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual §2Dl.l(c) (1993); id.% ch. 5, pt A (sentencing
table). He could have denied knowing the drugs were in
the car> trunk, but that strategy would have brought
little prospect of thwarting a criminal prosecution. He
therefore admitted involvement, but did so in a way that
minimised his own role and shifted blame to petitioner
Fredel Williamson (and a Cuban man named Shawn).
Most of Harris1 statements to DEA Agent Walton
focused on Williamson's, rather than Harris*, conduct.
Agent Walton testified to the following: During a brief
telephone conversation shortly after he was apprehended,
Harris said he had obtained 19 kilos of cocaine for
Williamson from a Cuban man in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida; he stated that the cocaine belonged to Williamson, and was to be delivered to a dumpster in the
Atlanta area that evening. App* 37. Harris repeated
this story to Agent Walton when the two spoke in
person later in the day. Harris also said that he had
rented the car a few days earlier and had included
Williamson's name on the rental contract because
Williamson was going to be in the Fort iauderdale area
with him, ld.} at 38-39. After Agent Walton aought to
arrange a controlled delivery, Harris retracted the story
about the dumpster, saying it was false.
Harris* second account differed as to collateral details,
but he continued to paint Williamson as the "big fish."
Harris reported that be was transporting the cocaine to
Atlanta for Williamson. When the police stopped Harris'
car, Williamaon was driving in front of him in another
rented car. After Harria waa stopped, Williamaon
turned around and pulled over to the aide of the road;
from that vantage point, he obaerved the police officer
inspecting the contents of Harris' trunk. # . , at 40-41.
And, Harris repeated, "the arrangements for the acquisition and the transportation had been made by Mr.
Williamson." # . , at 41.
7b the extent some of these statements tended to
incriminate Harris, they provided only marginal or
cumulative evidence of his guilt They project an image
of a parson acting not against his penal interest, but
striving mightily to shift principal responsibility to
someone else. See United States v. SarmitntO'Perett 633
F. 2d 1092, 1102 (CAS 1981) ("[The declarant] might
well have been motivated to misrepresent the role of
others in the criminal enterprise, and might well have
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viewed the atatement[e] at a whole—including the
ostensibly disserving portion*—to be in hie interest
rather than against it.").
For these reasons, I would hold that none of Harris*
hearsay statements were admissible under Rule
B04(bX3).* The trial Judge characterized Agent
Walton's testimony as ''very damning.* App. 50. The
prosecutor considered it so prejudicial that she offered to
join defense counsel's motion for a mistrial should the
trial court determine that the heareay statements had
been erroneously admitted. ld.% at 51 ( I f the [trial]
Court determines that it has been improper for [Agent
Walton] to aay those statements, then the Court must of
necessity declare a mistrial, because there it no way
they can remove what . . . they have heard that
Reginald Harris said about Predel Williamson, end the
Government will join in the [defensa counsel's) motion
(for e mistrial}* because I think that would be a burden
no one could overcome in the 11th Circuit."). I concur
In the Court's decision to vacate the Court of Appeale*
judgment, however, because I have not examined the
entire trial court record; I therefore cannot say the
Government should be denied an opportunity to argue
that the erroneous admission of the hearsay statements,
in light of the other evidence introduced at trial,
constituted harmless error See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
52(a); Xotte<iko$ v. Vnittd Statei, 328 U. 8. 750, 776
(1946) (error requires reversal of criminal conviction if
it is "highly probable that the error had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict").
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE
JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment.

and

I
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states the general rule
that hearsay evidence is Inadmissible in federal court
proceedings, but there are numerous exceptions. At
issue here is the exception contained in Rule 604(b)(3),
which allows admission of
"[a] statement which was at the time of ita making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another,
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unlese believing
it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admiaiible unleee corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement/
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good reason that they are true." Advisory Committee
Notes on Fed. Rule Cvid. 864, 2d U. S. C. App., p, 789.
Of course, the declarant may make his statement
against interaat (such as "I shot the bank taller*)
together with collateral but related declarations (such as
"John Doe drove the getaway car*). The admissibility of
those collateral statements under Rule 804(bXB) is the
issue we must decide here.
There has been a long-running debate among commentators over the admissibility of collateral atatemente.
Dean Wigmore took the strongest position in favor of
admissibility, arguing that "the statement may be
accepted not merely as to the apecific fact against
interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same
statement* 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence (1466, p. 271 (3d
ed. 1940) (emphasis deleted); see aleo 5 J. Wigmore,
Evidance {1465, p. 339 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1974);
Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East 109, 103 Eng- Rep. 717
(K. B< 1808). According to Wigmore, becauee "the
statement is made under circumstances fairly indicating
the declarant'e sincerity and accuracy," the entire
statement should be admitted. 5 J. Wigmore J1485, p.
271 (3d ad. 1940). Dean McConnfck'e approach regarding collateral atatemente was more guarded. He argued
for the admissibility of collateral atatemente of a neutral
character; and for the exclusion of collateral statements
of a self-serving character. For example, in the state*
ment "John and I robbed the bank." the words "John
and" are neutral (aave for the possibility of conspiracy
charges). On the other hand, the statement "John, not
I, shot the bank teller" is to some extent self-serving
and therefore might be inadmissible. Sea C. McCormick,
Law of Evidence §256, pp. 552-553 (1954) (hereinafter
McCormick). Professor Jefferson took the narrowest
approach, arguing that the reliability of a statement
against interest stems only from the disserving fact
stated and so should be confined "to the proof of the fact
which ia against interest." Jefferson, Declarations
Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 62-63 (1944). Under the Jefferson
approach, neither collateral neutral nor collateral selfaerving statements would be admissible.

Enacted by Congress in 1976, Rule 604(bX3) establishes a hearsay exception for statement* against penal,
proprietary, pecuniary, and legal interest (end does not
distinguish among those interests). The text of the Rule
does not tell us whether collateral statements are
admissible, however. See antt, at 5; see also Comment,
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory
Statement* Against Penal Interest, 66 Calif. L. Rev.
1189, 1202 (1978) ("The text of Rule 804(b)(3) by ittelf
provides little guidance and would accommodate comfortably either a doctrine excluding or one admitting
collateral statements"). The Court resolves the issue, as
The rationale of the hearsay exception for statements I understand its opinion, by adopting the extreme
against interest is that people seldom "make statements position that no collateral statements are admissible
which are damaging to themselves unless eatisfied for under Rule 804(bX3). 8ee oak, at 5 (adopting "narrower
reading" that -Rule 804(b)(8) coverts] only those declara•Nor aeuld an? ef Herri*' b»er»ey eUUment* be admitted uad*r tion or remarks within the confession that are individuRut* e0M4X9M&). vhieh provide* that eteteroenti made *by a ally self*inculpatory"); ant*, at 1 (OINSBURG. J„ concureocoiuplrator of a party during the court* and la nuthtrence of the
censpir&e/ are ix* heexeey The trial judf* laitielly *pp4*r*d ta ring in part and concurring in judgment); but cf, cnU,
feast hit ruling admitting the ttatemenU on the co-coaeaireter nil*. at 1-2 (SCAUA, J., concurring). The Court reaches that
See App. 14-96; id>, at 47 (1 let It in M e to<on*pir*tor »uu conclusion by relying on the "principle behind the Rule"
merit*). Tht proaecatot, however, "agreeCd] with {daftnee eouW] that reasonable people do not make atatemente against
totally* that Ithey are] not . . . statements in furtherance at th* their interest unless they are telling the truth, ante* at
eenipiraey"; Agent WeJton'a Uttimony, sh« explained, was "not
affered ttader (the eo-eompirater] axeeption," but under Rule 6» and raasona that this policy "expressed in the statu§04(bKB). App Al. I do not n*d the Court1! opinion, **U, At S, tory text," &nut at 8, "eiinply does not extend" to
n. \ to eogfeft that the hetn«y eteteroenti in thi$ out could K*T« collateral atatemente. Ante, at 6. Though conceding
been edfaitted under Rule SOKdXWE).
that Congress can "make atatemente admissible baaed on
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their proximity to eelf-inculpatory etatements,* the Court
eays that it cannot "lightly assume that the ambiguous
language meant anything ao inconsietent with the Rule's
underlying theory." Ante, at 6.
With raipect, I must disagree with this analysis. All
agree that the justification for admission or hearsay
•tatements against interest was, as it still is. that
reasonable people do not make those statements unless
believing them to be true, but that has not resolved the
long-running debate over the admissibility of collateral
•tatements, as to which there is no clear consensus in
the authorities. Indeed, to the extent the authorities
come close to any consensus, they support admission of
some collateral statements. See supra, at 2-3, Given
that the underlying principle for the hearsay exception
has not resolved the debate over collateral statements
one way or the other, I submit that we should not
assume that the text of Rule 804(bX3). which is silent
about collateral statements, in fact incorporates one of
the competing positions. The Rule's silence no more
incorporates Jefferson's position respecting collateral
•tatements than it does McCormiek's or Wigmore's.
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indications, we can presume that Congress intended the
principles and terms used in the Federal RUISB of
Evidence to be applied as they were at common law
See Daubert v. Merrell Vow Pharmaceutical Inc., 509
U. S. ^ i
(1993) (slip op., at 7); Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. 8. 504, 621-522 (1989);
United State* v. Abel, eupra, at 61-52; see also
Midlantic Nat Bank v. New Jereey Dept. of Environ*
mental Protection, 474 U. 8. 494, 601 (1986) {"if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation
of a judicially created concept, it makes thet intent
specific*). Application of that interpretive principle
indicates that collateral statements should be admissible.
"From the very beginning of this exception, it has been
held that a declaration against interest is admissible,
not only to prove the dissarving fact stated, but also to
prove other facta contained in collateral
statements
connected with the disserving statement1* Jefferson, 58
Harv. L. Rev., at 67; eee alec McCormick {256; 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence §1465 (3d ed< 1940). Indeed, the
Advisory Committee Note itaelf, in stating that collateral
atatemente would be admissible, referred to the "general
theory" that related etatements are admissible, an
n
indication of the state of the law at the time the Rule
Because the text of Rule 604(b)(3) expresses no was enacted. Rule 804(bX3) does not address the issue,
position regarding the admissibility of collateral state- but Congress legislated against the common law backment*, we must determine whether there are other ground allowing admission of some collateral statements,
authoritative guides on the question, tn my view, three end I would not assume that Congress gave the common
sources demonstrate that Rule 804(b)(3) allows the law rule a ailent burial in Rule 8Q4(bX9)<
admission of some collateral statements: the Advisory
There is yet a third reason weighing against the
Committee Note, the common law of the hearsay Court's interpretation, one specific to statements against
exception for atatemente against interest, and the penal interest that inculpate the accused. There is no
general presumption that Congress does not enact dispute that the text of Rule 804(bX3) contemplates the
statutes that have almost no effect.
admission of those particular statements. Absent a
First, the Advisory Committee Note establishes that textual direction to the contrary, therefore, we should
aome collateral statements are admissible. In fact, it assume that Congress intended the penal interest
refers in specific terms to the issue we here confront: exception for inculpatory etatements to have some
*lo]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in meaningful effect. See American Paper Institute, Inc. v.
terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no American Electric Power Service Corp.t 461 U- S. 402,
means always or necessarily the case: it may include 421 (1983) (court should not "imputfe] to Congress e
etatements implicating him, and under the general purpose to paralyze with one hand what it eought to
theory of declarations against interest they would be promote with the other*) (internal quotation marks
admissible as related etatements* 28 U. 8. C. App., p. omitted). That counsels against adopting a rule exclud790. This language eeems a forthright statement that ing collateral statements. As commentators have
collateral statements are admissible under Rule recognised, 'the exclusion of collateral statement* would
804(bX8), but the Court reasons that the policy ex- cause the exclusion of almost all inculpatory statepreaeed in the statutory text points clearly enough in ments.* Comment, 66 Calif. L. Rev., at 1207; eee also
one direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and
may have." Ante, at 8. Again, however, that reasoning the Confrontation Clause, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 159, 163
begs the question: What is the policy expressed in the (1988) ("most atatamente inculpating a defendant are
text on the admissibility of collateral atatemente? Aa only collateral to the portion of the declarants statement
stated above, the text of the Rule does not answer the that is against his own penal interest The portion of
question whether collateral atatemente are admissible. the statement that specifically implicates the defendant
When as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not is rarely directly counter to the declarant's penal
answer a question that must be answered in order to interest") (footnote omitted); Davenport, The Confrontaapply the Rule, and when the Advisory Committee Note tion Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Crimidoes answer the question, our practice indicates that we nal Prosecutions: A Functional Anelyaie, 85 Harv. L.
ahould pay attention to the Advisory Committee Note. Rev. 1876. 1396 (1972) ("the naming of another as a
We have referred often to those Notes in interpreting compatriot win almost never be against the declarant's
the Rules of Evidence, and I eee no reason to jettison own interest*). Indeed, as one commentator indicated,
that well-eatabliahed practice here. See Huddleeton v. the conclusion that no collateral statements are admissiVniUd State*, 4B5 U. 8. 681, 688 (1988); United State* ble—the conclusion reached by the Court today—would
v. Owen*, 484 U. 6. 554, 562 (1988); Bourjaily v. United "eviscerate the against penal interest exception.*
State*. 488 U. 8. 171, 179, n. 2 (1987); United State* v. Comment, 66 Calif. L. Rev., at 1218.
Abel, 489 U. 8. 4B, 61 (1984).
lb be sure, under the approach adopted by the Court,
Second, even if the Advisory Committee Note ware there are aome situations where the Rule would still
ailent about collateral atatemente, I would not adopt a apply. For example, if the declarant said that he stole
rule excluding ail atatemente collateral or related to the certain goods, the statement could be admitted in a
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order to thaw that the goods were Btolen. See 4 J.
Weinstein A M. Berger, Welnstein's Evidence
§804(bX3)[04J, p. 804-164 (1993); tee also ante, at 8-9.
But as the commentators have reeogniwd, it U likely to
be the rare ease where the precise self-inculpatory words
of the declarant, without more, also inculpate the
defendant. I would not presume that Congress intended
the penal interest exception to the Rule to have eo little
effect with reepect to itatemenU that inculpate the
accused.
I note finally that the Court's decision applies to
statements againBt penal interest that exculpate the
accused as well as to those that inculpate the accused.
Thus, if the declarant said* "I robbed the store alone,"
only the portion of the statement in which the declarant
said "I robbed the store" could be introduced by a
criminal defendant on trial for the robbery. See Not*,
Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of
Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 66
B. U. L. Rev. 148, 165. n. 96 (1976). That seems
extraordinary. The Court gives no justification for such
a rule and no explanation that Congress intended the
exception for exculpatory statements to have this limited
affect. See id.% at 166 ("A strict application of a rule
excluding all collateral statements can lead to the
arbitrary rejection of valuable evidence").
in
Though I would conclude that Rule 804(b)(3) allows
admission of statements collateral to the precise words
against interest, that conclusion of course does not
aniwer the remaining question whether all collateral
statement* related to the statement against interest are
admissible; and if not, what limiting principles should
apply The Advisory Committee Note euggests that not
all collateral statements are admissible. The Note
refers, for example, to McCormick's treatise, not to
Wigmor-a'e, for guidance as to the "balancing of self*
serving against disfserving] aspects of a declaration." 28
U, S. C. App„ p- 790. As noted iupro, at 2, Wigmore's
approach would allow the admission of "every feet
contained in the same statement," but McCormick's
approach is not eo expansive. McCormick stated that
"(a] certain latitude as to contextual (i.e., collateral]
statements, neutral as to interest, giving meaning to the
declaration against interest eeems defensible, but
bringing in self-serving statements contextually seems
questionable." McCormick $256, p. 662. McCormick
further stated that, within a declaration containing selfserving and disserving facts, he would "admit the
disserving parts of the declaration, and exclude the selfserving parts" at least "where the serving and disserving
parts can be severed." Id. §266, p. 653. It thus appears
that the Advisory Committee Note, by its reference to
(and apparent incorporation of) McCormick, contemplates
exclusion of a collateral self-serving statement, but
admission of a collateral neutral statement.
In the criminal context, a self-serving statement is one
that tends to reduce the charges or mitigate the punishment for which the declarant might be liable. See M.
Graham. Federal Practice and Procedure §6795, p. 810,
n. 10 (1992). For example, if two masked gunmen
robbed a bank and one of them shot and killed the bank
teller, a statement by one robber that the other robber
was the triggerman may be the kind of self-serving
statement that should be inadmissible. See ibid.
(collateral self-serving statement is "John used the gun").
(The Government concedes that such a statement may
t» inadmissible. See Brief for United States 12.) By
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contrast, when two or more people are capable of
committing a crime and the declarant simply names the
involved parties, that statement often is considered
neutral, not self-serving. See Graham, Mupra, at 810, n.
10 ("the statement 'John and I robbed the bank' is
collateral neutral"); Note, 66 B. U. L. Rev., at 166, n. 96
("An examination of the decisions reveals that, with very
few exceptions, collateral Cecta offered as part of a
declaration against penal interest are neutral rather
than self-serving"); I N generally Uniud State* v. York,
933 F. 2d 1343, 1362-1364 (CA7 1991); Uniud State$ v.
Cosamotto, 887 F. 2d 1141, 1171 (CA2 1989).
Apart from that limit on the admission of collateral,
eelf'serving statements, there is a separate limit applicable to cases in which the declarant made his statement
to authorities; this limit applies not only to collateral
statements but also to the precise words against penal
interest. A declarant may believe that a statement of
guilt to authorities is in his interest to some extent, for
example as a way to obtain more lenient treatment, or
simply to clear his conscience. The Note takes account
of that potentiality and states that courts should examine the circumstances of the statement to determine
whether the statement was "motivated by a desire to
curry favor with the authorities." 28 U. 8. C App., p.
790. That appears consistent with McCormick's recognition that "even though a declaration may be against
interest in one respect, if it appears that the declarant
had some other motive whether of self-interest or
otherwise, which was likely to lead him to misrepresent
the facts, the declaration will be excluded." McCormick
§256, p. 553.
Of course, because the declarant is by definition
unavailable, see Fed. Rule Evid. 804(a), and therefore
cannot he questioned to determine the exact motivation
for his statement, courts have been forced to devise
categories to determine when this concern is sufficient
to justify exclusion of a statement as unreliable. It has
been held, for example, that a statement to authorities
admitting guilt, made after an explicit promise of
dropped charges or of a reduction in prison time in
exchange for the admission of guilt, may be so unreliable as to be inadmissible. See, e.g., Uniud State* v.
Ma&ana*Oli>era, 917 F. 2d 401, 407-409 (CA9 1990);
Uniud Statu v. Scopo, 861 F. 2d 839, 348 (CA2 198B)
("If . . . a pleading defendant had an agreement with
the government or with the court that he would not be
punished for the crimes to which he allocuted, then that
allocution would not subject him to criminal liability and
would not constitute a statement against his penal
interest"). At the other extreme, when there was no
promise of leniency by the government and the declarant
was told that he had a right to remain ailent and that
any statements he made could be used against him, the
courts have not required exclusion of the declarant's
statement against interest. See id, at 346-349; United
StaU$ v. Garcia. 897 F. 2d 1413, 1421 (CA7 1990)
(declarant not motivated by desire to curry favor;
"voluntarily made his statement after being advised of
his Miranda rights and did not enter into any plea
agreements with the government"). This kind of linedrawing is appropriate and necessary, lest the limiting
principle regarding the declarant's possible desire to
obtain leniency lead to the exclusion of all statement*
against penal interest made to police, a result the Rule
and Note do not contemplate.
Id sum, I would adhere to the following approach with
respect to statements against penal interest that
inculpate the accuaed. A court first should determine
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whether the declarant made a atatement that contained
a fact against penal intareat See anU% at 10 (opinion
of O'CONNOR, J.) ('Some of Harris' confession would
clearly have been admissible under Rule 804(bX8)*). If
so, the court should admit all statements related to the
precise atatement against penal interest, subject to two
limits. Consistent with the Advisory Committee Note,
the court should exclude a collateral atatement that i6
eo aelf-serving as to render it unreliable (if, for example,
it shifts blame to aomeone else for a crime the defendant could have committed). In addition, in cases where
the atatement was made under circumstances where it
is likely that the declarant had a significant motivation
to obtain favorable treatment, as when the government
made an explicit offer of leniency in exchange for the
declarant** admission of guilt, the entire atatement
should be inadmissible.
A ruling on the admiisibility of evidence under Rule
804(bX3) I* * preliminary question to be determined by
the District Judge under Rule 104(a). That determination of necessity calls for an inquiry that depends to a
Urge extent on the circumstance* of a particular case.
For this reason, application of the general principles
here outlined to a particular narrative atatement often
will require a difficult, factbound determination. District
Judges, who are close to the facta and far better able to
evaluate the various circumstances than an appellate
court, therefore must be given wide discretion to examine a particular atatement to determine whether all or
part of it ehould be admitted. Like the Court, then, I
would remand this ease, but for application of the
analysis set forth in this opinion.
BENJAMIN S. WAXMAN, Miami, Fls. (ROBBINS, TUNKEY,
ROSS, AMSEL * RABEN, P.A., on the briefs) for petitioner; JOHN
F. MANNING, Astlfitni to Solicitor General (DREW S DAYS HI,
So!. OenM JO ANN HARRIS, Aist. Atty. Gen., snd DAVID S.
KRIS, Dept. of Justice *uy.» on the briefs) for respondent.
No. 05-44
TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., ET AL.,
APPELLANTS u. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION ET AL.
ON APPEAL PROM THE UNTTED 8TATE8 DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA
Syllabus
No. **~44. Argued January 22.19M—D#ckUd June 27.1894
Concerned that a eeenpatitive imbalance between cabletelevisionsad
ev*r~th**air broadeaatera w u endangering the broadcasters' abflity
to compete for s viewing audience and thai for necessary operating revaatiat, Congress passed the Cehla Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992. ficetlens 4 and o of the
Act require sabls television systems to devote a specified portion
ef their channalt to ths transmission of local commercial and
broadcast stations. Boon altar the Act baeami law, appelnumerous sabls programmere snd optrstors, challenged the
eonetitutJonality of tbe must-tarry provisions- Tbe District Court
granted the United States and inurf#rmr-d«f«uUnu summary
Judgment, ruling thai the provisions art consistent with the Plrst
Amendment TO* taint rejected appellants* argument that ths
provisions warrant strict scrutiny as a eontent-beead raeulation
and sustained thorn under ths Intermediate standard of scrutiny
eat forth in Vniui Statu w OHri*\ 191 U. 8. 1*7, concluding
that they are eulttcisntly tailored te seres ths Important govsrnsaonta) Intorest la ths preservation of Iocs) broadcasting.
aWeV TVs Judgment is •seated, and ths ease Is remanded.
e i i P. Jtopp. I2» vacated and roraandod.
JUetlCI XaNNimr dolxvorod tha opinion ef the Court with re>
•pact is Parts L D. and m-A, concluding thai the appropriate
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standard by which to evaluate the constitutlonaHty of the mutttarry provision* ii ths intermediate Itvsl of scrutiny applicable to
content-neutral rastrictions thst impose an incidental burden on
speech.
(a) Becauae the must-carry provisions impose special obligations upon cable opsrstors and special burdens upon cable programmers, heightened Plrst Amendment scrutiny it demanded.
The Itts rigorous standard of scrutiny now roicrvtd for broadcast
regulation, sot Rtd Lion Broadcasting Op. v, FCC, 895 U. S. 367,
should not bo extended to cable regulation, tince the rttionelt for
such review—-the dual problems of spectrum scsrciiy and tignel
interference—<doea not spply in the context of cable. Nor ii the
mere sssenion of dyafunetien or failure in the cable market,
without more, sufficient to shield s speech resulttion from the
Pirtt Amendment standarde applicable to nanhroedctet media.
Moreover, while enforcement of s generally applicable lsw agtintt
members of the preia msy sometime* warrant only rational bail!
scrutiny, lawe that single out the prett for special treatment pott
a particular danger of abuse by the State snd are always subject
to some degree of heightened ecruUny.
(b) The must'csrry rules are content-neutral, and thus art not
subject to strict scrutiny. They arc neutral on their face because
they dlstlngulah between speakers in the television programming
market bassd only upon the murmur in which pngrsmmsn tana*
mit their message! to viewert, not the moitsget they carry. Tbe
purpoeoi underlying the must-carry rules are also unrelated to
content. Congrats* overriding objective wai not to favor program*
ming of s particular content, but rather to preserve ecieta to free
television programming for the 40 percent of American! without
table. The challenged provision^ design snd operation confirm this
purpote. Congress' acknowledgement thst broadestt television
station* make s valuable contribution to the Nation's communications structure dosi not indicate thst Congrats regarded broadcast
programming te he more valuable than cable programming; rather,
h reflects on)y the recognition thst the services provided by broadcasttelevisionhave some Intrinsic value and are worth preserving
against the threats posed by cable. It is also incorrect to suggest
thst CongTesi enacted must-carry In an effort to exercise eonunt
control over what subscribera view on cable television, given the
minimal extent to which the Federal Communication! Commliaion
and Congrest influence the programming offered by broadcast
station*.
(c) None of appellants' additional arguments sufllcee to require strict scrutiny in this ease. The provitlons do not intrude on
the editorial control of cable operators. They are content-neutral
in application, and they do not forte cable opera ton to alter their
own message! to respond to the broadcast programming they must
carry. In addition, the physical connection between the televition
set and the cable network gives cable operators bottleneck, or
gatekeeper, control over most programming delivered into subscribers' hornet. Miami Hsmld Publishing Co. v. Ibrnillo, 4 IS
V. 6. 241, and Pacific Cos et EUctric Co. v. Public Vtilitm
Common cfCal.t 475 U. 8. 1, distinguished. Btriet scrutiny is alto
not triggered by Congrats1 preference for broadcasters over cable
opera tort, since it is hased not on the content of the programming
each group offers, but on the belief thst broadcast television it in
economic peril. Nor is such scrutiny warranted by the fact that
the provisions single out certain members of the prats—here, cable
operators—for disfavored treatment Such differential treatment
is justified by ths special characteristics of the table medium—
namely, the sable operators' bottleneck monopoly and ths dsngers
this power poest to the viability of broadcast te)evision~and
because tha must-carry provisions are not structured in s msnner
that earrtee the inherent riak of undermining Plrst Amendment
interests, Arioasas Wriun' Projecl, /ac v. Magland, 481 U. S.
221, and Ht*nsapt>ti* Star 6 TWow Co. v. Je/iaaesolo Ccmm'r of
JUixrua, 460 U. 8. ft?*, distinguished. *
(d) Under O'Briga, a oontent-neutra) regulation will be tutseined if it furthers an important governmental Interact thst it
unrelated te ths luppraeeion of free expression and tha incidental
restriction en alleged Pint Amendment freedoms it no greater
than Ut essential to the furtherance of thst Inttrett. Viewed in the
abstract, each of ths governmental interests asserted—preserving
the benefits of fret, ovsr.the-air local broadcast statlont, promoting
the widespread dissemination of information from s multiplicity of
aourcas, and promoting fair competition la the market for televj.
aion programming—is important.
JUSTICE Kimtxtrr, joined by Txt CHWT JUSTICE, JUSTICE

BLACXUUN, and Jutnct 8ouTEa, concluded in Pan X2J-B that the
fact thst the asserted Interests are important in the abstract does
not msan that ths must-carry proviaiont will in fact advance those

